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Japanese Postwar Attitudes Towards
International Trade and Investment
By HOBART McK BIRMNGHAM
J.D., University of Michigan, 1971; Lecturer, Legal Problems in Inter-
national Trade and Investment, University of Michigan Law School
1974; Partner, Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, Los Angeles and San
Francisco, California.
I. THE CURRENT CRISIS
When introducing Japan, scholars often take pains before be-
ginning to point out that Japanese history, politics, society and
culture are replete with paradoxes and contradictions. The terms
paradox and contradiction also aptly describe Japan's international
and economic posture in the postwar period. Japan has aggressively
exported high-quality finished goods and has energetically sought
investment opportunities throughout the world; at the same time,
it has maintained a domestic economy which by comparison to this
aggressive export posture appears immune to imports and foreign
investment. This is as anomalous as the Japanese businessman who
wears a suit and tie and works in a modern, Western-style office
building, but who returns home at night to relax in a light summer
kimono on tatami straw mats. Americans involved with Japanese-
American economic relations have often been irritated and frus-
trated by the difference between the way Japan approaches the
world and the manner in which Japan allows the world to approach
it. On a more profound level, these same Americans have been
troubled because this disparity threatens in the long run to under-
mine the foundations of the strong economic and political partner-
ship which has developed between the United States and Japan
since the end of World War II.
Recent events have brought this troublesome disparity into
sharp focus. The most important of these events has been the
United States' bilateral trade deficit with Japan, which amounted
to more than eight billion dollars in 1977.1 This accounted for
roughly forty percent of the United States' entire trade deficit for
1977. Predictions for the United States' bilateral trade deficit with
1. Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 3, col. 6.
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Japan for 1978 run from 13 '/2 billion dollars to 15 billion dollars. 2
Since 1971, when the Bretton-Woods Fixed Rate system was aban-
doned, the dollar has declined from 360 yen to the dollar to almost
210 yen, a reduction of forty-two percent. Furthermore, more than
half of this decline has occurred since January 1978 and recent
efforts to prop up the dolllar have managed to raise the rate to only
206 yen. These events led to the direct criticism of Japanese trade
policies by the Secretary of Commerce, Mrs. Kreps, and by the
United States Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Mansfield. 3 While Secre-
tary Kreps led a trade delegation of American businessmen to
Tokyo for the express purpose of increasing American exports,
American newspapers were charging Japan with protectionism, and
retaliatory protectionist sentiment in Congress appeared to be at a
postwar high.4
Japan has responded to this international pressure with few
concessions. In the trade talks between United States Ambassador
Strauss, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, and Japan's Economic Minister Nobuhiko Ushiba, in the
spring of 1978, Japan balked at even relatively minor concessions on
the import of beef and citrus fruits, and negotiators were unable to
make any meaningful progress towards the goal of solving the large
trade imbalance between the two countries. In response to criticism,
a Japanese official could even be heard to repeat the old cliche that
"Japan must export to live."15 To Japan's credit, it has made some
unilateral tariff reductions and relaxed exchange controls.6 How-
ever, it is unlikely that these will have a significant long term im-
pact on Japan's trade surplus with the United States.
Belatedly, when Japanese political and business leaders recog-
nized the seriousness of the problem and the deep feelings it gener-
ated, they embarked on speaking tours of the United States and ran
full-page newspaper advertisements explaining Japan's position,
hoping to defuse American impatience. 7 Often these explanations
sounded inadequate, emphasizing the higher rate of growth in the
United States, the weak export orientation of the American econ-
2. L. A. Times, Oct. 11, 1978, § 3 at 18, col. 5.
3. L. A. Times, Sept. 20, 1978.
4. Tharp, Is Japan Pulling Its Weight?, Wall St. J. Oct. 4, 1978 at 24, col. 3.
5. Address by Consul General Amau before the Japan Society of San Francisco (Mar.
1978) (transcript available through Information Office of Japanese Consulate in San Fran-
cisco).
6. United States-Japan Trade Council, Council Report No. 2, Jan. 18, 1978; Council
Report No. 6, Jan. 26, 1978; Council Report No. 9, Feb. 9, 1978.
7. R. Hosokawa, H. Kato, & M. Miyoshi, Dialogue with Japan, Wall. St. J., Sept. 29,
1978, at 19, col. 1 (advertisement) [hereinafter cited as Dialogue with Japan].
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omy and the high level of oil imports into the United States.8 Al-
though each of these explanations had substantial merit and made
clear that Japan should not be a scapegoat for many of the United
States' problems, it did not explain why the Japanese economy had
for so long remained virtually closed not only to trade and invest-
ment of the United States, but also to that of the entire industrial-
ized world. The anger and resentment of the United States, Japan's
most important trading partner, was being met with what an
American observer had privately characterized on a prior occa-
sion as "studied avoidance" of international problems, issues and
obligations.
2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
History in part explains Japan's reluctance to embrace the in-
ternational economic order of free trade and investment at home
with the same enthusiasm that it has successfully evidenced abroad.
Geographically isolated from Asia, Japan was able to enjoy the ben-
efits of Asian civilization, yet it was able to avoid direct conflicts
with other societies and ethnic groups. Geography enabled the Japa-
nese to achieve a separate and independent identity and made it
possible for them to assimilate foreign cultural influences in unique
ways which fit easily into the existing society. Direct foreign inter-
vention in the Japanese domestic society was not only unwelcome
but was practically unknown. Not surprisingly, Japan has eagerly
borrowed Western knowledge, techniques and institutions, but at
the same time has stubbornly resisted Western influence which has
threatened to compromise Japanese independence or dislocate the
indigenous social order. '
In the sixteenth century, Japan actively traded throughout
East Asia and enthusiastically received Western traders and Chris-
tian missionaries. However, when Western religion, trade and poli-
tics were perceived to constitute a serious threat to the newly estab-
lished political order of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Shogunate
banned Christianity. It forbade the Japanese from trading overseas
and permitted trade only with the business-minded Dutch. Further-
more, the Shogunate confined Dutch traders to a small island in the
port of Nagasaki far from the new capital of Edo, which later be-
came the modern Tokyo. From the early seventeenth century until
the mid-nineteenth century, Japan continued its evolutionary de-
velopment more isolated from foreign influence than ever before.
8. Id.
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In 1853, Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay at the head
of a flotilla of warships and demanded, on behalf of the United
States, that Japan open itself to free trade. This ended Japan's
isolation. Japan was forced into a series of unequal treaties and
suddenly faced the prospect of Western domination and possible
colonization. Japan's hostility to this Western intrusion culminated
in the overthrow of the existing government and the collapse of the
feudal social and political order. Struggling to stave off foreign dom-
ination, conservative samurai revolutionaries took the helm of gov-
ernment and leadership in business in order to modernize Japan.
Their success is exemplified by the fact that the economic patterns
which were firmly established during that period still survive today.
Japan industrialized in order to preserve its independence and
autonomy. However, industrialization of Japan created an economy
which now is dependent on imports for necessary raw materials,
food and energy, and upon exports and export markets to pay for
these necessary imports. Therefore, industrialization has ironically
resulted in a precarious dependence on the international economy
from which Japan cannot escape. In its more than one hundred
years of trade, Japan has experienced chronic foreign exchange shor-
tages.9 On three occasions in the postwar period alone, foreign ex-
change difficulties have been severe enough to temporarily slow
Japan's growth rate.'0 More dramatically, despite all their postwar
success and riches, the oil embargo of 1973-1974 made the Japanese
feel exposed, weak, and vulnerable. Furthermore, the subsequent
quadrupling of oil prices virtually halved Japan's rate of growth."
These historical experiences influence Japanese thinking more deci-
sively than does the current payment surplus, which the Japanese
may even regard as a temporary aberration in the larger pattern of
their history. From this perspective, business and government lead-
ers alike have difficulty imagining a Japanese economy even more
open to international trade and even more dependent on the inter-
national economy.
The early Japanese government and business leaders shared
the goals of rapid modernization and forged an alliance between
business and government which survives to the present day. Their
cooperative efforts successfully modernized Japan before the war,
9. K. Ohkawa & H. Rosovsky, A Century of Japanese Economic Growth, in THE STATE
AND ECONOMIC ENTERPISE iN JAPAN, 47, 51 (W. Lockwood ed., 1965) [hereinafter cited as
LOCKWOOD].
10. W. Lockwood, Japan's "New Capitalism" in LoCKWOOD, supra note 8, at 447, 449-50
[hereinafter cited as Japan's "New Capitalism'].
11. United States-Japan Trade Council, Council Report No. 42, Sept. 21, 1978.
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and since the war they have rebuilt Japan and placed it in the front
ranks of modem industrialized nations. As Professor Lockwood has
pointed out, the framework for the close relationship of business and
government exists without much statutory authority and consists of
a complex network of established business, personal and institu-
tional relationships that are uniquely Japanese.12 Business and gov-
ernment leaders are uncertain of how foreign business can be assimi-
lated into the tightly knit web of informal connections that bind
government and business together, and it is feared that foreign busi-
ness would upset the finely-tuned balance of various economic com-
ponents that has made Japan so successful.
The character of this relationship has also been decidedly na-
tionalistic. For the early modem Japanese enterpreneurs, business
was not only the road to power and riches but also constituted
participation with government in a patriotic task whose goals were
modernization, preservation of Japan's autonomy, and eventual
equality with the West. After the war, Japan was foreclosed from
using military means to achieve independence and equality. Suc-
cess in business and international trade remained as the only ave-
nue for reasserting Japan's dignity and influence in the world.
The nationalistic orientation of the Japanese business and gov-
ernment community has minimized Japan's reliance on the West in
the process of modernization. Borrowings abroad during the early
modern period were limited and quickly repaid. Western advisors
were replaced as soon as their Japanese counterparts could absorb
the technical and scientific knowledge these advisors imparted. In
the postwar period, Japan has endeavored to obtain superior West-
ern technology on the least costly terms possible and with minimum
foreign involvement. In large measure, these policies have been suc-
cessful. However, as a result, Japan is poorly prepared to accept at
home the free interchange of trade and investment that should be
the concomitant of its policies abroad.
Japan's refusal to rely on foreign capital has also caused govern-
ment and business to work closely to channel Japan's limited re-
sources into those particular industries which are perceived to have
the most promise for Japan's future. In the past, industries such as
silk and textiles were emphasized. More recently, steel, automo-
biles, shipbuilding, and electronics have benefited from government
policy. This has led, however, to uneven growth and the creation of
a two-tier economy characterized by a dominant tier of internation-
ally competitive industries serviced by an inefficient second tier of
12. Japan's "New Capitalism", supra at 490.
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small manufacturers, service-oriented businesses and a multilay-
ered distribution system.13 Anyone who has lived in Japan is famil-
iar with this second tier through the goods sold domestically in the
numerous "mom 'n pop" stores. This second tier of industry which
sells mediocre products at high prices would be poorly equipped to
compete domestically with a retail marketing giant such as Sears
with American goods at American prices. Furthermore, the close
business-government relationship makes government agencies sus-
ceptible to pleas from these inefficient producers for protection, and
legislation has been enacted to protect these inefficient enter-
prises. 13.
From the perspective of free trade and investment, the impor-
tant components in Japan's domestic economic and political equa-
tion are: dependence on imports, foreign exchange shortages, the
clublike nature of business-government relations, the nationalistic
orientation of business, the vulnerable second tier of the economy,
and Japanese insularity and striving for autonomy. All these histori-
cal currents combine to make Japan instinctively and stubbornly
adverse to genuine concessions in the areas of foreign trade and
investment. Foreign businessmen and lawyers have complained
about statutes, regulations and restrictions which bar the passage
to successful trading and investing in Japan. However, these prohi-
bitions represent only the tip of an iceberg of emotional resistance
aganst trade and investment by foreigners in Japan and against
complete integration of Japan's domestic economy with the world
economy.
3. POSTWAR HISTORY OF CAPITAL
LIBERALIZATION
Although the postwar international economy is based upon con-
cepts of free trade, free investment and free exchange as expressed
in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Charter (IMF) and the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development Code (OECD), Japan has
in the past raised many legal obstacles to effective integration with
the international economy. In the area of trade, many of these ob-
stacles are not well understood and can be as varied as the products
13. DAN F. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN, LAW AND POLICIES 104 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HENDERSON].
13.1. See, for example, Law Concerning the Regulation of Business Activities of Large
Entrepreneurs to Protect Opportunities for Business Activities by Small and Medium Enter-
prises, Law No. 74 of 1977.
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which traders attempt to bring into Japan in addition to tariffs and
import quotas. There have been charges of unreasonable standards
of purity, unnecessarily detailed inspections, bureaucratic stalling
and pettifogging, and straightforward legal harassment. Secretary
Kreps has directed the Commerce Department to catalogue these
non-tariff barriers to trade, and the results of this study may show
what has been alleged for many years-namely, Japan's protection-
ism.
To observers who witnessed the attempts of American and
Western European investors in the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's,
to surmount the obstacles Japan erected to foreign investment in
Japan, the current situation is familiar. Then foreign businessmen
and officials were strenuously urging Japan to open itself to foreign
investment so that they could take advantage of investment oppor-
tunities. Today, foreign businessmen and officials are likewise vigor-
ously imploring Japan to allow the sale of foreign goods freely in
Japan so that they can take advantage of trade opportunities. In
both cases, they have met stiff resistance from Japanese business-
men and governmental officials but in the former case progress was
eventually achieved. If the free flow of capital and technology are
corollaries of free trade and are but pieces of the whole cloth of an
opeh international economy, we may assume that in the history of
Japan's treatment of foreign investment there is a clear record of
Japan's response to the challenge of a free international economic
order. This then can serve as a guide to understanding Japan's
reactions in the current situations. Furthermore, it is the legacy of
Japan's trade and investment policies during these years that has
set the stage for the current imbalance in economic relations be-
tween the two countries. In examining the history of Japan's post
war policies, some understanding can be arrived at of how the two
countries reached their present positions.
Since 1950, Japan has regulated foreign investment under the
Law Concerning Foreign Investment [hereinafter referred to as the
Foreign Investment Law]. In essence, the statute requires that in-
vestment in a Japanese enterprise established under Japanese law
be validated by the government. 4 Without validation, profits can-
not be remitted out of Japan under Japan's foreign exchange laws.
14. Law No. 163 of 1950 (as amended), art. 2. It should be noted that the Foreign
Investment Law does not apply to the establishment of a branch of a foreign entity in Japan.
There are no explicit controls regulating branch establishment in Japan, but the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law No. 228 of 1949, as amended) has been
utilized by restricting inward and outward remittance of funds to achieve a similar, although
not identical, form of regulation.
No. 1]
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Validation, however, includes a foreign exchange license and for
practical purposes a guarantee that profits can be remitted. The
statute is purposely vague as to the procedure for validation and the
standards by which validations are to be granted or withheld. These
matters are left for resolution by Cabinet order and ministerial ordi-
nance.
The purpose of the statute, when it was enacted, was to regulate
the flow of investment into Japan in order to protect both Japan's
precarious international balance of payments and foreign investors'
reasonable expectations that profits could be repatriated. It states
the following:
The purpose of this Law is to create a sound basis for foreign
investment in Japan by limiting the induction of foreign invest-
ment to that which will contribute to the self-support and sound
development of the Japanese economy and to the improvement of
the international balance of payments, by securing remittances
arising from foreign investment, and by providing for adequate
protection for such investments.'5
Reflecting the unfavorable balance of payments when it was en-
acted, the Foreign Investment Law provided for periodic reports to
the Cabinet on the international balance of payments and for steps
to be taken in the event of an emergency."6 Underlying the statute
was also the understanding that Japan was economically prostrate
after World War II and direct government intervention in the pro-
cess of capital and technical induction was necessary to prevent
powerful and technologically superior American and foreign compa-
nies from overpowering their Japanese counterparts.
At the same time, it recognized that the nature of the problem
was temporary when it stated the following:
Foreign investment in Japan shall be permitted to be as free as
possible, and the system of validation pursuant to the provisions
of this Law shall be relaxed and eliminated gradually as the ne-
cessity for such measures decreases.'7
The statute envisioned relaxation of standards and eventual repeal,
but the different Japanese and foreign perceptions of when this
should occur generated considerable controversy and friction be-
tween Japan and its trading partners.
Parallel to the restrictions on foreign investment, the Foreign
15. Id. art. 1.
16. id. arts. 4-5.
17. Id. art. 2.
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Investment Law also requires validation of license and technical
assistance agreements by foreign licensors to Japanese licensees.18
Without validation or a separate foreign exchange license, royalty
payments cannot be remitted out of Japan. In contrast to foreign
investment, foreign technology was urgently needed by the Japa-
nese, because Japan had been effectively isolated from Western
technological progress during the war. If it were to compete effec-
tively against Western nations in the international area, licensing
of technology was important. The guarantee that royalties could be
repatriated, which validation provided, was thus an important in-
ducement to potential foreign licensers.
Under the Foreign Investment Law and the orders and ordi-
nances adopted under it, potential foreign licensers and foreign
investors were obliged to undergo an arduous and complex valida-
tion process only partially prescribed by statute and largely subject
to bureaucratic discretion. Usually, presentation of an application
for validation was preceded by informal negotiations with officials
of various ministries over the contents of the application, the terms
of the technical assistance contract, or the nature and scope of the
proposed investment. After submission of the application and re-
view by the Bank of Japan, it would then be passed on to the appro-
priate ministries for further review and evaluation. During this en-
tire process informal negotiations continued with the government
in effect becoming a third party with whom the potential foreign
investor or licenser was required to negotiate. The government
perceived its role as protecting the Japanese party to the transac-
tion and wrung concessions from the foreign party which the Japa-
nese party could not win alone. After modification of the application
and the terms of the proposed investment or license so that it met
the requirements of various reviewing officials, the application was
forwarded to the Preliminary Screening Committee of the Foreign
Investment Council, an interministerial body, for further review
and finally to the Foreign Investment Council itself for approval.
Once granted, the validation imposed severe limitations on the
scope of business and future activity. A change in the line of busi-
ness or the nature of operation would usually require repetition of
the same process. Sometimes the foreign investor would be re-
quired to enter into a formal undertaking with the government
limiting future activity outside of the preapproved limits.
Cabinet orders, ministerial ordinances and internal regulations
governed much of this process, but even more was left to official
18. Id. art. 10.
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discretion. Although the regulations did not publicly set forth maxi-
mum royalty rates or percentages of ownership, practitioners in
Tokyo who specialized in representihg foreign enterprises knew with
reasonable certainty what was likely to be accepted and what was
likely to be rejected. For example, royalty rates in excess of five
percent and ownership interest in excess of fifty percent were unu-
sual. Furthermore, they followed shifts in official opinion closely to
determine what new concession or what new demands the govern-
ment might make. The broad scope of discretion exercised by Japa-
nese officials was galling to foreign lawyers accustomed to Western,
especially American, law which circumscribed official discretion
with exacting standards. It was not so different from what could be
expected in any underdeveloped country concerned with powerful
outside business influences, but by the early 1960s it was incon-
gruous in an economically revived Japan. By then, Japan had re-
covered from its post war economic depression, and it was able to
compete with the other industrialized nations. Full recognition of,
Japan's recovery occurred in April 1964, when Japan graduated into
the front rank of industrialized nations by becoming a full member
of the OECD. Full OECD membership meant that Japan not only
acquired the benefits of membership but also undertook, toward the
other members, responsibilities which included liberalization of
capital movements. 9
This was more easily said than done. Through the validation
process, Japan has been able to acquire new technology at low
prices. Furthermore, through the validation process, Japan had
been able to limit foreign equity participation and keep Japanese
business largely free from foreign domination and control. Although
the administration of the Foreign Investment Law went far beyond
its original intent, it fit well into the Japanese experience of assimi-
lating foreign cultures without challenging the nation's identity or
fracturing its established social patterns. It also fit well into the
nationalistic thrust of Japanese modernization. Carefully regulated
exposure of the Japanese business world to foreign technology and
capital posed few thorny questions of foreign encroachment, in-
19. OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, Article l(a). Japan did lodge
reservations to the Code as it was entitled to do, and "direct investment" was among the
categories reserved. Nonetheless, the overall significance of OECD membership placed a
heavy burden on Japan to comply not only with the letter but also with the spirit of OECD
membership. It has also been argued that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion Between the United States'and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863,
imposed obligations on Japan to liberalize that were as significant as its OECD commit-
ments. However, Japan's resolve to liberalize crystalized in the context of its OECD member-
ship, not the treaty.
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creased international vulnerability and fierce domestic competition
outside established well-known routines.
It is not surprising that Japan first moved backwards away
from liberalization in contemplation of liberalization. Until 1964
foreign investors in Japan could, despite the Foreign Investment
Law, establish a company without government approval so long as
they were able to invest in yen and were willing to forego the guaran-
tee that profits could be repatriated. That alone was sufficient to
prevent many investors from organizing what were called yen-base
companies, but it was an avenue for establishing a wholly-owned
subsidiary in Japan for those who had long term objectives and
foresaw improvements in Japan's international payments. In 1967,
the Japanese government announced that it would no longer permit
organization of yen-base companies by foreign parties without vali-
dation. This move was widely perceived as an attempt to blunt the
effects of Japan's anticipated liberalization.20 There was no foreign
exchange rationale for requiring validation of yen-base companies,
and this move demonstrated how the Foreign Investment Law had
been transformed from an instrument for protecting Japan's foreign
exchange into one of protectionism generally. It also showed how
difficult it would be for Japan to fulfill liberalization commitments.
Japan's reluctant attitude had been evidenced earlier when it
became a member of the OECD. Japan had agreed that it would
"disapprove applications [for validation] only in exceptional cases
where serious detrimental effects to the economy were to be
feared. ' 2' However in interpreting this language, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry [hereinafter referred to as
MITI], one of the most influential ministries in the validation pro-
cess, stated that "the basic policy shall be to permit capital induc-
tion so long as there is no particular interference with the national
economy".22 At least as perceived by MITI, Japan's commitment
still gave it considerable flexibility, especially when viewed from the
perspective of Japan's long term historical interests. Japan had,
however, made a commitment to liberalization, and some public
action to fulfill this commitment was necessary if only to satisfy the
complaints of Japan's trading partners, especially the United
States.
20. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 255.
21. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development and the Government of Japan Concerning Assumption by the Government
of Japan of the Obligations of Membership of the Organization, 1963.
22. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Daily Bulletin No. 4099, June 30, 1963
(quote obtained from unpublished confidential memorandum).
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In 1967, three years after becoming an OECD member, Japan
announced a program whereby liberalization of capital investments
was introduced in a series of steps or rounds.1 The announcement
in 1967 constituted only the first of these steps, but it also estab-
lished the framework in which liberalization was to be defined.
There were several important points. First, the essence of liberaliza-
tion was neither elimination of the validation requirement nor even-
tual repeal of the Foreign Investment Law. Instead, liberalization
meant relaxation of the standards of approval and simplification of
the process. This relaxation and simplification was called
"automatic" validation, although "less discretionary" would have
been a more accurate term. The usual time for validation was to be
shortened, government review was to be more cursory and negotia-
tion between government officials and foreign investors was to be
eliminated or at least minimized. Validation as it had been con-
ducted was now called "case by case screening." Liberalization in
this fashion was accomplished solely through modification of regula-
tions and internal procedures without disturbing the statutory
framework.
Second, the investments eligible for automatic validation were
restricted. Investment in existing Japanese enterprises, except on a
portfolio basis, was not eligible. Furthermore, the industries open to
investment through a new enterprise were limited to designated
categories. This classification was further divided into industries
which were open to a maximum of fifty percent participation and
those in which up to one hundred percent ownership was permitted.
Third, several conditions were made prerequisites to applica-
tion for validation on an automatic basis. They prohibited auto-
matic validation where investment in a new enterprise was a dis-
guised takeover of an existing business through contributions in
kind, transfers or leases. Furthermore, a business was not to be
allowed to expand beyond the scope of the originally permitted
activity without further approval. If the industry were only open to
a fifty percent foreign investment, it was required that the Japanese
investors have coequal control and that this control not be diluted
by requiring greater voting requirement for corporate decisions than
required by the Commercial Code. Likewise, Japanese interests
were required to have at least an equal number of directors on the
board and these directors were required to be Japanese citizens.
Furthermore, in the case of an industry open only to a fifty percent
investment, one of the Japanese investors was required to be in the
23. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 237 ff.
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same business as the new company and to have at least one-third
interest in the company. Finally, as provided by the OECD Code,
an application for foreign investment could be refused automatic
validation if it were determined to be extremely detrimental to the
interests of Japan.
The context in which most foreign companies invested in Japan
made these various restrictions unattractive. Until recently, most
foreign companies found that the most profitable way to do business
in Japan was to exploit technological superiority through manufac-
turing in Japan. The Japanese, for their part, were eager to acquire
foreign technology. The simplest way to exploit the technology was
to license it to an existing Japanese entity. However, the govern-
ment was concerned by the prospect of technologically superior for-
eign companies using the lever of technology to strike unfair bar-
gains which would burden Japanese industries with restrictive con-
ditions, broad grant backs of technology, and excessive royalties. To
prevent this, the government severely limited the terms and the
royalties foreign licensers could impose in license agreements. As a
result of this policy, a transfer of technology usually becomes finan-
cially attractive only when it could be tied to an equity participation
in the Japanese licensee. This gave the licenser an opportunity to
participate in profits as well. Therefore, foreign investment in a new
Japanese company was often only an adjunct of a technology trans-
fer. The transfer could either be through a contribution in kind of
the technology for stock or a direct capital investment coupled with
a license agreement.24 Where ownership was shared with a Japanese
party, as was usually the case, the enterprise was labeled a joint
venture.
In addition to being an explicit part of validation on an auto-
matic basis, these conditions were often implicit in the standards
by which proposed foreign investments were reviewed in general.
They were also consistent with Japan's nationalistic economic goals.
By requiring at least equal ownership and control for Japanese and
by severely restricting investment in existing enterprises, they
maintained Japanese control of Japan's own domestic industries.
By further requiring that the Japanese party to the investment al-
ready be in the same line of business and by limiting the evolution
24. Under the Japanese Commercial Code, contributions-in-kind were extremely com-
plex. Shoho (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899 (Japan). To avoid this, the company
was usually organized with Japanese capital. It then purchased the technology from the
prospective foreign investor who used the proceeds to purchase his stock. Although not strictly
a contribution-in-kind, the term seems an appropriate shorthand way of describing the pro-
cess.
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of the business, they ensured the assimilation of the new entity into
the existing framework of business and government relationship.
These same conditions, however, made a Japanese joint ven-
ture company prone to failure, whether approved by an automatic
validation or through the more elaborate requirements of case by
case screening. By not allowing investment in existing enterprises,
risks were increased since the new enterprise had to recruit manage-
ment and employees, obtain production facilities and create a dis-
tribution network. It often relied on its Japanese partners for man-
agement, employees, facilities and distribution. This allowed the
Japanese party to dominate the new company. By requiring that the
Japanese party be in the same line of business as the new company,
the Japanese stockholder was probably a competitor or potential
competitor of the foreign party, and the new joint venture company.
Insofar as the Japanese were only interested in the technology and
perceived no long term benefit from continued cooperation with the
foreign party, the Japanese party could manage the company for its
own benefit, siphon off profits through unfair arrangements for pro-
duction or sales, or in some cases even adopt the technology and
compete directly with the new company. Likewise, requiring co-
equal control prevented the foreign participant from having control
over corporate action and deprived him of practical remedies.
Therefore the Japan partner often had little interest in the success
of the joint venture. By further limiting the new company to its
original line of business, it was less likely that the new enterprise
could evolve and grow in a normal way. Instead it was more likely
to become less profitable as the technology on which it depended
became obsolete. The foreign party's advantage often lay in the
importance of continuing future transfers of knowledge and im-
proved technology. Where a product was successful and the interest
of Japanese and foreign parties could be kept in a healthy balance,
successful joint venture enterprises could emerge. Just as likely if
not more so, was the failure of the Japanese joint venture. In many
cases, joint venture companies formed under these restrictions have
been dissolved or the foreign participant's interest has been sold to
the Japanese party. Often in these cases the foreign party continued
to license its technology, but without equity participation. It is
worth noting in this context that the three most profitable foreign
enterprises in Japan, IBM-Japan, Coca-Cola-Japan, and Nestle-
Japan, are not joint ventures but are wholly-owned subsidiaries able
to operate free from of many of these limitations.2
25. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 367.
[Vol. 2
Japanese Postwar Attitudes
The final condition, that automatic validation could be denied
where it was determined that it would be extremely detrimental to
the interests of Japan, although acceptable under OECD Code, was
an avenue by which Japan could retreat from its liberalization pro-
gram whenever domestic political hostility to a particular invest-
ment was intense enough to warrant protective measures. Because
of the close relationship between business and government, many
feared that the government would be unduly susceptible to business
pressure and would invoke this protection more than necessary.
Furthermore, this condition emphasized that even automatic vali-
dations were ultimately discretionary. As liberalization has evolved,
the government has not often found it necessary to use this reason-
ing to exclude a proposed investment.
After 1967, there were two additional rounds of liberalization,
the second in 1969 and the third in 1970. Within the framework
announced in .1967, each round expanded the number of industries
open to fifty percent and one hundred percent investment. Each
round was preceded by intense lobbying by business and bitter in-
terministerial debate over which industries should be newly in-
cluded. The industries finally opened were of apparently little inter-
est to foreign business. One knowledgeable observer estimated that
by the middle of 1971 after three rounds and four years of liberaliza-
tion that, at most, $1,000,000 had been invested under automatic
validations. The success of business in excluding any categories of
interest attests to the strength of the relationship between govern-
ment and business. Until 1971, Japan had apparently subordinated
liberalization to its traditional interests.
The international business and diplomatic community was not
blind to the lack of real progress during the first three rounds. Its
dissatisfaction with Japan's efforts to fulfill its commitments to
liberalize was made known in clear terms. This discontent was exac-
erbated by Japan's international trade and payments surpluses,
especially with the United States, which even at that time were
large. Therefore, by 1971, Japan was under heavy pressure to liber-
alize genuinely. In early discussions concerning the fourth round,
the government formulated a program of fifty percent liberalization.
Certain industries were to be excluded from the application of the
fifty percent principle and others were to be open to foreign control
and ownership up to one hundred percent. However, unless ex-
cluded, an industry was to be theoretically open to at least a fifty
percent foreign investment. The familiar struggle between business
and government and between ministeries within the government
was intensified since the industries which could be excluded were
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limited in light of the international criticism of Japan. After months
of negotiating and lobbying, the fourth round of liberalization was
announced on August 3, 1971. In it, the Japanese government
adopted "in principle" fifty percent liberalization. Unless stated
otherwise, all industries were now open to automatic validation of
up to fifty percent foreign ownership. At the same time, 220 indus-
tries were designated as open to foreign control. Certain industrial
categories remained closed to investment except through validation
obtained on a case-by-case screening basis. These categories had
been reduced to the following seven industries: (1) oil refining and
sales; (2) electronic computers and peripheral equipment; (3) data
processing; (4) leather products; (5) retail sales involving eleven or
more stores; (6) agriculture, forestry, and fishery; and (7) real es-
tate.2 Furthermore, investment in certain additional fields was
impliedly restricted in the belief that even the OECD Code did not
require liberalization in these areas. These were industries such as
communications, transportation, energy and national defense.
The framework established in 1967 was still intact. Investment
in existing enterprises continued to be restricted, and the precondi-
tions to applications for approval on an automatic basis continued
to apply. It was uncertain at that time how the 1971 program would
be applied. There had been enough juggling of numbers and bitter
controversy preceding this round of liberalization to cause some
observers to wonder, in light of the previous three rounds, whether
the 1971 round was another in a series of exercises in futility.
In retrospect, the 1971 round of liberalization must be regarded
as a genuine step forward. Although it did fall far short of complete
liberalization, potential foreign investors found that it was often
possible to obtain automatic validations under the streamlined pro-
cedures in approximately one month. It was still difficult to be
precise in predicting government action, but obtaining validations
had been simplified for practical purposes in many cases. Reflecting
the change in mood, the process of acquiring a validation on a case-
by-case screening basis also became easier after the 1971 round of
liberalization.7
The momentum of the fourth round carried the government
26. Id. at 245.
27. The government did undertake measures to prepare Japan for freer foreign invest-
ment. These included strengthened enforcement of Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law, Law Con-
cerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of 1947,
as amended, with respect to international transactions and measures assigned to other do-
mestic industries which faced increased competition. The most notable of these efforts was
in the computer field.
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into further consideration of complete liberalization in late 1972
after further intense government-business negotiations. On April 27,
1973, the Japanese government announced the fifth and final round
of liberalization in a brief Cabinet decision. It stated that in light
of Japan's economic strength and the importance of avoiding pro-
tectionism abroad, Japan would from May 1, 1973, "adopt the one
hundred percent liberalization principle stipulated in the OECD
Code." This decision provided that inward investment would be
approved automatically except in certain situations. For the first
time investment in existing enterprises was eligible for automatic
validation, unless it was "unclear" whether the enterprise had con-
sented to the acquisition. Finally, certain fields were to be com-
pletely liberalized at a future date specified in the decision. The
most notable was the computer industry which was to be completely
liberalized as of April 1, 1976. Of the pre-conditions to automatic
validation, only one appeared to have any remaining validity. That
was that the proposed investment not have an extremely detrimen-
tal effect on Japan. Certain industries continued to be open to in-
vestment only on a non-liberalized basis. However, the number had
now been reduced to five: they were (1) primary industries related
to agriculture, forestry and fisheries; (2) mining; (3) oil; (4) leather
products manufacturing; and (5) retail trade operations in excess of
50% with less than 11 outlets. The other restricted industries implic-
itly continued to be closed under general OECD principles. Al-
though a typical Japanese compromise between the competing
domestic interests and international pressure could be discerned
in this announcement, Japan appeared to have largely lived-up to
the spirit of the OECD Code by 1973.
No one could have predicted the Arab-Israeli war in late 1973,
the Arab oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices in early 1974.
These events disrupted both the Japanese and international econ-
omies, and Japan entered a period of recession and high inflation.
Thereafter, currency adjustments and the high relative value of the
yen made Japan one of the most expensive and least attractive
nations in which to invest. Furthermore, the technological gap be-
tween Japan and other countries, especially the United States, had
been narrowed, and there was less technology that could be profita-
bly exploited." Therefore, after 1973, large scale foreign interest in
investment in Japan largely evaporated.
It is difficult to assess the genuine impact of the 1973 round in
this context. For the investment which now occurs, it is generally
28. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 94.
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expected that most applications for validations will be given a rou-
tine review and that approval can be secured in approximately two
weeks. Therefore, validation no longer appears to represent a serious
obstacle to investment. The validation requirement has occasion-
ally been utilized to halt an investment which poses an apparent
threat to established Japanese concerns. In one celebrated case,
Dow Chemical was unable to get a validation for a plant in Japan
as a result of protests by large domestic producers who complained
of a depressed domestic market and dire financial situations. Al-
though the record is inconclusive it generally supports the proposi-
tion that foreign capital for practical purposes can now freely enter
Japan.
Even if foreign investment controls are largely history, the ef-
fects of a quarter century of restriction on foreign trade and invest-
ment are still very much present. During this long period American
and other foreign companies, with a few notable exceptions, have
been unable to exploit inherent advantages, to invest in domestic
companies and wholly-owned subsidiaries and to play a significant
role in the Japanese market and the Japanese economy. Overcom-
ing this heritage must be a long-term process.
4. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
In 1965, Professor Lockwood wrote, "(i)n short, when the Japa-
nese bargain abroad for markets today they do so as a powerful,
prosperous people no needier of markets than many others. They
can hardly plead for trading opportunities abroad unless they are
prepared to grant reciprocal benefits at home."2 This statement is
still relevant today. When written, these words referred to the com-
pletely protectionist nature of the Japanese policy, both as to trade
and capital movements. Today they could refer as well to the trade
imbalance which, in part, is the result of Japan's protectionist his-
tory.
Apparently, Japan is moving toward an open trade policy, and
official statements recognize the need for change. In a White Paper
published in 1978, MITI acknowledged that Japan's large trade
surplus can only be reduced through increased internationalization
of the Japanese economy, especially through emphasis on increased
imports of manufactured goods. 0 Similar sentiments were recently
addressed by Mr. Shenji Fukukawa, Director of the Policy Planning
29. Japan's "New Capitalism," supra note 10, at 478.
30. United States-Japan Trade Council, Council Report No. 41, Sept. 14, 1978, at 1.
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Office, Ministerial Secretariat of MITI.3 ' Furthermore, some observ-
ers believe that trade restrictions are a thing of the past.3 2 If MITI's
pubic position signals a genuine change in attitude, the prospects
for eventual progress in trade liberalization are good. There are
some indications that this may already be occurring. Japan has
unilaterally eliminated or reduced certain tariff and trade barriers
and allowed the imports to increase at a rapid rate. At the same
time trade representatives to Japan have encountered continuing
resistance to the import of finished and manufactured goods.
Japanese businessmen are heard to ask why Japan should import
goods which it can manufacture at home, and government bidding
procedures apparently appear to favor domestic suppliers. 31
The dichotomy in Japanese attitudes was apparent in a recent
Wall Street Journal advertisement entitled Dialogue with Japan, in
which representatives of Japanese industry responded to questions
posed by American readers.34 In response to a question about Japa-
nese imports costing Americans jobs, Mr. R. Hosokawa of the
Mainichi Newspaper delivered a persuasive argument for the com-
parative advantage of importing low cost goods and warned against
the danger of protectionism. However, in responding to another
question concerning Japanese restrictions on beef imports, Dr. H.
Kato, Professor of Economics at Keio University, took a different
position. He answered by reminding readers of the importance of
the people employed in the beef industry in Japan, and he pro-
posed that import restrictions be lifted gradually only after the
Japanese beef industry had sufficiently rationalized production so
that it could meet import competition. The inconsistency of these
two positions is apparent, and they suggest that many Japanese
still do not perceive free import trade as the inevitable corollary of
open export markets.
Several lessons learned from the history of Japan's capital lib-
eralization can be applied to predict the course of trade liberaliza-
tion. First, domestic political considerations make relaxation and
removal of restrictions difficult. Second, Japan is likely to respond
to persistent and sustained international business and diplomatic
pressure. Third, under this pressure, Japan will probably make con-
cessions, albeit reluctantly and gradually. Fourth, even after the
removal of restrictions, it may take many more years to rectify the
31. Fukukawa, The Need for a Change in the Industrial Structure, Wall St. J., Sept. 29,
1978, at 16, col. 2 (advertisement).
32. Abegglen and Hout, Facing Up to the Trade Gap with Japan, 57 FoRmGN AFFAIRS
147 (1978).
33. L. A. Times, Oct. 11, 1978, at 18, col. 5.
34. Dialogue with Japan, supra note 7.
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economic distortions and imbalances that have developed in the
relatively protected atmosphere of the past.
On a private level, the foreign lawyer should be careful in
studying trade liberalization to discern the import of changes in
statutes, regulations and official conduct, not only from a legalistic
perspective, but also in the perspective of the shift in current Japa-
nese policy. This shift should be seen against the backdrop of the
history of Japan's modernization, postwar economic expansion and
progress toward economic integration with the international econ-
omy. A lawyer should also be alert to the possibility that trade
liberalization may be retarded if external events threaten Japan's
trading position or if a reduced payments deficit causes countries
such as the United States to shift attention to other matters. He
must also consider the potential dangers clients may face in dealing
with different points of view within the Japanese government in a
time of policy change.
On a national and diplomatic level, both Japan and the United
States must continue to regard correction of the large trade imbal-
ance as a serious problem. Trade representatives such as the United
States Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Weil, have com-
mented that the Japanese believe that the United States' threats
of protectionism are bluffs in the poker game of trade negotiations
between the two countries. If Japan believes that with time and
patience the United States and other countries will lose interest
when attempts at rapid solutions fail, then U.S. policymakers
must match Japanese persistence and undertake a long term com-
mitment to finding needed solutions. This must be done with the
understanding that in light of Japan's many years of trade and
investment restrictions, solutions to the present imbalance will be
long term ones to which the United States should be committed.
They should also realize that powerful domestic political consider-
ations in Japan make rapid progress unlikely. Policymakers should
not lose sight of these long term solutions even in the midst of
formulating palliative measures to cope with the current situation.
Japan's trading partners must be patient and persistent. The
Japanese for their part must overcome their chronic insecurity and
be persuaded of the benefits at home, as well as abroad, of free trade
and an open international economic order. They iaust recognize the
quid pro quo which is essential to this structure so that they may
voluntarily accept the commitments of GATT, OECD and IMF, not
only in the letter, but also in the spirit in which they were written.
35. L. A. Times, Oct. 11, 1978, § 3 at 18, col. 5.
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